🛰️ Daily AI Frontier
‹ back to 2026-08-10

ColluSkill: Adversarial Cross-Skill Composition for Evading Agent Skill Scanners

Research LLM Agents

Ranking

Overall 70
Content 75
Popularity 60

Observed public metrics from 1 member.

Merged summary

TL;DR - An arXiv cs.CR paper showing that LLM agent "skill" scanners, which inspect skills one at a time, can be evaded by splitting a malicious intent across several individually benign-looking skills that only become harmful when composed at execution time. It matters because agent skill marketplaces are becoming a real attack surface and current defenses have a structural blind spot.

  • ColluSkill decomposes a malicious goal into interdependent sub-payloads packaged as separate skills; the attack emerges from ordered composition via contextual dependencies, artifact passing, and execution handoffs rather than any single bad skill.
  • It uses LLM-based chain planning plus scanner-feedback refinement to keep chain-level attack semantics while suppressing suspicious signals in each individual sub-skill.
  • Against six representative skill scanners, ColluSkill reports a 96.0% average attack success rate, outperforming single-skill and prior multi-skill baselines.
  • The proposed defense, ChainGuard, scans a candidate skill jointly with already-installed skills — reconstructing cross-skill dependencies, artifact flows, and capability composition — cutting ASR to 22.5% while passing 99.5% of benign workflows.

Sources (1)

ColluSkill: Adversarial Cross-Skill Composition for Evading Agent Skill Scanners

arXiv cs.CR Puyu Zeng, Simeng Qin, Jingzhi Li, Ju Jia, Zheli Liu, Xiaojun Jia 2026-08-10 arXiv:2608.09732
Public signals Semantic Scholar citations 1 · Semantic Scholar influential citations 0
Providers: Hugging Face · N/A OpenAlex · N/A Publisher · N/A Semantic Scholar · Citations 1 · Influential citations 0 X · N/A Fetched 2026-08-21 14:23:45.480069 UTC

TL;DR - An arXiv cs.CR paper showing that LLM agent "skill" scanners, which inspect skills one at a time, can be evaded by splitting a malicious intent across several individually benign-looking skills that only become harmful when composed at execution time. It matters because agent skill marketplaces are becoming a real attack surface and current defenses have a structural blind spot.

  • ColluSkill decomposes a malicious goal into interdependent sub-payloads packaged as separate skills; the attack emerges from ordered composition via contextual dependencies, artifact passing, and execution handoffs rather than any single bad skill.
  • It uses LLM-based chain planning plus scanner-feedback refinement to keep chain-level attack semantics while suppressing suspicious signals in each individual sub-skill.
  • Against six representative skill scanners, ColluSkill reports a 96.0% average attack success rate, outperforming single-skill and prior multi-skill baselines.
  • The proposed defense, ChainGuard, scans a candidate skill jointly with already-installed skills — reconstructing cross-skill dependencies, artifact flows, and capability composition — cutting ASR to 22.5% while passing 99.5% of benign workflows.
item →