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From Deceptive Outputs to Deceptive Mechanisms: A Causal Framework for Language-Model Deception Research

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TL;DR - This paper proposes a causal taxonomy for distinguishing language-model outputs that merely appear deceptive from behavior driven by a deceptive mechanism. Controlled experiments show that recipient knowledge can causally influence deceptive preferences, but this does not establish that models possess agency.

  • The taxonomy separates prior commitments from retrospective reports and internal preferences from realized outputs.
  • It distinguishes false preferences from sensitivity to the utility of misleading a recipient.
  • Guessing-game and stock-trading experiments across two open-weight model families find deceptive-looking behavior without the hypothesized deceptive mechanism.
  • Other interventions directly show that a recipient’s information state can affect a model’s preference for deception.

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From Deceptive Outputs to Deceptive Mechanisms: A Causal Framework for Language-Model Deception Research

arXiv cs.AI Yakov Pyotr Shkolnikov 2026-09-03 arXiv:2609.04166
Public signals Semantic Scholar citations 1 · Semantic Scholar influential citations 0
Providers: Hugging Face · N/A OpenAlex · N/A Publisher · N/A Semantic Scholar · Citations 1 · Influential citations 0 X · N/A Fetched 2026-09-21 14:25:33.152065 UTC

TL;DR - This paper proposes a causal taxonomy for distinguishing language-model outputs that merely appear deceptive from behavior driven by a deceptive mechanism. Controlled experiments show that recipient knowledge can causally influence deceptive preferences, but this does not establish that models possess agency.

  • The taxonomy separates prior commitments from retrospective reports and internal preferences from realized outputs.
  • It distinguishes false preferences from sensitivity to the utility of misleading a recipient.
  • Guessing-game and stock-trading experiments across two open-weight model families find deceptive-looking behavior without the hypothesized deceptive mechanism.
  • Other interventions directly show that a recipient’s information state can affect a model’s preference for deception.
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